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Abstract: This paper presents a political analysis of school-based management reform in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH). School-based management (SBM), based on the principle of school autonomy 
and community participation, is a school governance system introduced in many parts of the world, 
including post-conflict nations. Such a phenomenon seems to follow the pattern predicted by the 
theories of institutional isomorphism. According to the institutionalists in comparative education, a 
country adopts global education reforms so as to enhance nation-building and nation-state 
legitimacy within the international community (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997; Ramirez & 
Boli, 1987). However, a closer look at the SBM reform adoption process in BiH reveals that, after 
legislating the global reform, policy leaders appear to have willfully derailed its implementation. 
Careful analysis of their legitimacy contexts suggests that BiH leaders may have adopted the 
internationally-driven reform policy primarily for the purpose of enhancing their precarious 
domestic legitimacy. Such behavior can be explained by Weiler’s (1983; 1990) political utility theory, 
which has not yet been sufficiently incorporated into the analysis of educational reform transfer. The 
study posits that policy leaders in reform-borrowing countries still play a crucial role in shaping 
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education systems, even in the globalized world that is arguably driving these systems to converge. It 
is then important for comparative and international education scholars, as well as international 
donors, to critically assess the intent, practices and behaviors of the political leaders who accept 
global reforms. 
Keywords: Bosnia and Herzegovina; decentralization; education reform; institutional 
isomorphism; political utility theory; politics of education; post-conflict nations. 
 
¿Por qué los dirigentes políticos adopten reformas educativas globales? Un análisis político 
de la adopción “Administración Basada en la Escuela” después del conflicto de Bosnia y 
Herzegovina. 
Resumen: Este artículo presenta un análisis político de la reforma de la Administración Basada en la 
Escuela, en Bosnia y Herzegovina (ByH). La Administración Basada en la Escuela (SBM por sus 
siglas en inglés), basado en el principio de autonomía de los centros y la participación de la 
comunidad, es un sistema de gestión escolar introducido en muchas partes del mundo, incluidos 
países en las áreas de post-conflicto. Este fenómeno parece seguir el patrón predicho por la teoría de 
isomorfismo institucional. Según los institucionalistas en el campo de la educación comparada, un 
país adopta las reformas educativas globales con el fin de mejorar la construcción de la nación y la 
legitimidad del Estado-nación en la comunidad internacional (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, y Ramírez, 1997; 
Ramírez y Boli, 1987). Sin embargo, una mirada más de cerca el proceso de adopción de la reforma 
de SBM en Bosnia y Herzegovina revela que, después de legislar la reforma global, los líderes 
políticos parecen haber descarrilado voluntariamente su aplicación. Un análisis cuidadoso de los 
contextos de legitimidad sugiere que los líderes de Bosnia y Herzegovina pueden haber adoptado la 
política de reforma internacional impulsada principalmente con el propósito de mejorar su 
legitimidad interna precaria. Este comportamiento se explica por la teoría de la utilidad política de 
Weiler (1983, 1990), que aún no se ha incorporado suficientemente en el análisis de la transferencia 
de reformas educativas. Este trabajo postula que los líderes políticos de países que adoptan reformas 
todavía juegan un papel crucial en la formación de los sistemas educativos, incluso en el mundo 
globalizado que posiblemente esta conduciendo estos sistemas a converger. Es entonces importante 
que los especialistas en educación comparada e internacional, así como los donantes internacionales, 
evalúen críticamente las intenciones, prácticas y comportamientos de los líderes políticos que 
acepten las reformas globales. 
Palabras clave: Bosnia y Herzegovina; descentralización; reforma de la educación; isomorfismo 
institucional; teoría de la utilidad política; política de la educación; países post-conflicto. 
 
Por que os líderes políticos adotam reformas educacionais globais? A análise 
política da adoção “Administração Baseada na Escola” após o conflito na Bósnia e 
Herzegovina. 
Resumo: Este artigo apresenta uma análise política da reforma da gestão da escola na 
Bósnia e Herzegovina (BIH). A “Administração Baseada na Escola” (SBM por sua sigla em 
Inglês), baseada no princípio da autonomia institucional e participação da comunidade, e 
um sistema de gestão escolar introduzida em muitas partes do mundo, incluindo os países 
nas áreas de pós -conflito. Esse fenômeno parece seguir o padrão previsto pela teoria do 
isomorfismo institucional. De acordo com os institucionalistas no campo da educação 
comparada, um país adota reformas educacionais globais, a fim de melhorar a construção 
da nação e a legitimidade do Estado-nação na comunidade internacional (Meyer, Boli, 
Thomas, e Ramirez, 1997 , Ramirez e Boli, 1987). No entanto, um olhar mais atento ao 
processo de aprovação da reforma SBM na Bósnia e Herzegovina, revela que depois de 
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legislar reforma abrangente, os líderes políticos parecem ter descarrilado voluntariamente a 
sua aplicação. Uma análise cuidadosa dos contextos de legitimidade sugere  que os líderes 
da Bósnia-Herzegovina podem ter adotado a reforma política internacional impulsionado 
principalmente com o objetivo de melhorar a sua precária legitimidade doméstica. Isto é 
explicado pela teoria da utilidade política de Weiler (1983, 1990), que não tem sido 
suficientemente incorporadas na análise da transferência de reformas educacionais. Este 
artigo argumenta que os líderes políticos dos países que adotam reformas continuam a 
desempenhar um papel crucial na formação de sistemas de ensino, mesmo em um mundo 
globalizado, que está impulsionando a convergência dos sistemas. Portanto, é importante 
que os especialistas em educação comparada e as agencias internacionais de financiamento, 
avaliem criticamente as intenções, práticas e os comportamentos dos líderes políticos que 
aceitam as reformas globais. 
Palavras-chave: Bósnia e Herzegovina; descentralização; reforma da educação; 
isomorfismo institucional; teoria da utilidade política; política de educação; países pós-
conflito. 
Introduction 
Educational reforms around the world have often been characterized as isomorphic (Baker 
& LeTendre, 2005). In particular, educational reforms in post-conflict nations, such as Kosovo, 
Timor-Leste, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), are expected to closely follow global trends 
because the international organizations that are heavily involved in these nations’ institution building 
often guide or pressure the new governments into conforming with global reform models. In this 
way, education governance reforms in these nations are expected to look similar. A closer look at the 
reform implementation in BiH, however, reveals resistance to it by the very authorities who adopted 
the reform. This indicates a need to pay closer attention to the practices and behaviors of national 
policy leaders when they adopt the reforms advocated by international organizations (these reforms 
are hereafter referred to as “global reforms”). Such an inquiry may illuminate the dimensions of 
reform adoption and transfer that isomorphic theories do not fully explain. 
Drawing upon Hans N. Weiler’s (1983; 1990) political utility theory, this paper offers a 
political analysis of the school-based management (SBM) reform adoption in BiH by focusing on the 
national authorities’ decision to accept the reform, and their practices and behaviors with regard to 
its implementation. Despite their agreement with the SBM reform, as signified by the ratification of 
the national Framework Law on education that introduced decentralized school governance, the 
ruling political parties exhibited reluctance to implement the reform. The political leaders’ reluctance 
or resistance is illustrated by delaying the adoption of by-laws and by retaining ministry control in 
school governance. Considering the public’s general disapproval of their governments, such 
leadership behavior can be explained by political utility theory. The theory posits that a national 
authority adopts decentralization in order to increase their legitimacy, rather than to actually 
redistribute power (Weiler, 1983; 1990). It is possible to argue that BiH political leaders presented 
themselves as reformers in tune with “European global standards,” thereby responding to the 
public’s aspiration for European integration, while in reality preserving the status quo as much as 
possible during the reform implementation stage. By offering a political analysis of the SBM reform 
in BiH, this paper intends to contribute to a better understanding of educational reform adoption in 
the globalized world. At the end of the paper, implications for studies on global education transfer 
and international engagement in education assistance are discussed. 
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Context 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a divided society. During the sixth and seventh centuries, South 
Slavs immigrated to the Balkans, and many of them later adopted Christianity. Many also converted 
to Islam during the 400 years of the Ottoman occupation. In the early 1990s, Yugoslavia, which 
included BiH, became engulfed in a series of internal ethnic conflicts. The violent conflicts were 
particularly severe in BiH where there was no absolute ethnic majority. When the republics of 
Slovenia and Croatia declared separation from Yugoslavia, Bosniak (Muslim) leaders in BiH 
followed suit. This ignited a military confrontation between the three major ethno-national groups 
(Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats) and involved many civilians. The Bosnian conflict lasted three years, 
from 1992 to 1995, resulting in more than 100,000 deaths and the displacement of half the 
population (Bakke, Cao, O’Loughlin, & Ward, 2009). BiH became a sovereign state in 1995 due to 
the Dayton peace agreement mediated by the international community. Presently, the population of 
3.8 million is comprised of approximately 43.7% Bosniaks (Muslims), 31% Serbs (Orthodox 
Christians) and 17.3% Croats (Catholics) (OSCE, n.d.).  
As a result of the conflict, the education governance system is highly fragmented along 
ethno-national lines. The BiH state consists of two major “entities,” namely the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and Republika Srpska (RS), plus the Brčko district. FBiH is further 
partitioned into 10 cantons. The education ministries in the 10 cantonal governments, RS entity 
government, and Brčko district government have extensive jurisdiction over education in their 
respective localities. Since the war ended, these regional governments have been dominated by 
political parties promoting ethno-nationalistic agendas, such as the Party of Democratic Action 
(SDA) representing the nationalist interests of Bosniaks, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) 
dominating the RS, and the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ), a Croat 
nationalist party. Since the state-level government never had meaningful functions in the area of 
education, these twelve regional governments, or more precisely their ruling ethno-national parties, 
have been the key policy leaders in shaping the BiH education systems. These parties have promoted 
their agendas through ethnically segregated schooling and ethnocentric curriculums. 
Another notable characteristic of the public policy-making process in BiH is the intensive 
involvement of the international community, reflecting a post-cold war form of international peace-
keeping operations. At the conclusion of the war, an Office of High Representative (OHR) was set 
up by the United Nations to supervise and monitor the implementation of the peace agreement. In 
2002, the OHR delegated its responsibility to monitor and assist education to the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Since then, the OSCE has worked with other 
European agencies to align BiH education with “European standards.” This transition to the 
European norms is important since the majority of BiH citizens hopes for EU integration (UNDP, 
2007). The OSCE and its partner European organizations periodically assess the progress in BiH 
and their assessment is used to help determine the nation’s candidacy for EU membership.  
Since the end of the war, a major challenge confronting the ruling BiH political parties has 
been their weak legitimacy and the general lack of trust among local constituents. To illustrate this 
point, a 2003 UNDP survey (n=1900) found that the citizens were largely skeptical regarding the 
fairness of government practices. Governments at all levels were perceived to be partial, 
discriminatory and non-participatory (UNDP, 2003). The BiH public generally wants constitutional 
change and a new political structure (UNDP, 2007). A 2010 survey shows that the majority of 
citizens (87 percent, n=2000) felt that nationalist parties were leading the country in the wrong 
direction (National Democratic Institute, 2010). Their ethno-centric agendas are not appreciated by 
the citizens, and many citizens have stated that they are willing to engage in inter-ethnic cooperation 
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(O’Loughlin, 2010; Whitt, 2003). In addition, the level of corruption in BiH is said to be the highest 
in Europe (Transparency International, 2009), further reducing the public confidence in the 
governments and their political leadership. In view of this situation, Domm (2007) argued that 
building public trust in political institutions needed to be given priority over institutional 
effectiveness. The adoption of global reform models by BiH authorities should then be analyzed 
within these contexts. By viewing the legitimacy deficit of national leaders as an important policy 
context, this paper seeks to explain the adoption of an internationally popular SBM reform in post-
conflict BiH from a political perspective. 
SBM Reform 
The education governance reform principles in BiH are laid out in its two state-level 
documents: the Education Reform policy paper published in 2002 and the Framework Law on Primary 
and Secondary Education (hereafter, Framework Law) passed in 2003 by a BiH bicameral National 
Assembly representing the three dominant political parties. These two documents, drafted with the 
support of international experts from the European Union (EU) member states, define the school 
governance system in BiH. The Education Reform paper first declares that education needs to be 
depoliticized, then states that BiH education is governed by the notion of democratic and 
participatory school management (Government of BiH, 2002). Such a notion of school management 
is said to be in accordance with European organizational standards and norms (OSCE, 2006). The 
Framework Law then established that the SBM reform was intended to strengthen school-based 
governance by shifting the locus of authority from the regional governments to local actors 
including parents and local communities. The Framework Law specifies that the school benefits from 
autonomy whereby the school director is responsible for school management and the pedagogical 
process, and a school board representing the local school community oversees school policy 
(Government of BiH, 2003). After the Framework Law was passed, the twelve regional governments, 
dominated by the same ethno-national political parties that controlled the BiH National Assembly, 
were expected to promptly pass their respective by-laws to implement the SBM reform. 
Central to the SBM reform is the establishment of school boards to enhance school 
autonomy and community participation in school management. The Framework Law sets up the 
school board as the primary decision-making body, with tasks ranging from drafting a school’s 
annual plan to appointing school directors1 “with the aim of increasing civic-government links and 
promoting a sense of local ownership” (OSCE, 2006, p. 21). The roles of school boards are defined 
to achieve the purpose of the SBM reform, as the school board represents “the interest in 
promoting a decentralized, democratic school management body capable of decision-making – a 
body that would ensure appropriate accountability measures and would bridge the community and 
education officials” (OSCE, 2006, p. 14). The reform was intended to ensure the school’s 
accountability to the community it serves, thereby depoliticizing education, improving inter-ethnic 
relations and forging trust between schools and their communities (OSCE, 2006).   
The Framework Law includes two essential provisions to ensure that school boards reflect the 
principles of local ownership and civic engagement. First, it regulates that the local community and 
parents must have as many seats on the board as government officials. Article 51 of the Framework 
Law establishes that “the school board members are elected from school staff, school founder, local 
community and parents, in accordance with legally proscribed procedure, and based on principle of 
equal representation of all structures’ representatives” (Government of BiH, 2003, p. 15). It should 
                                                 
1 School principals or heads are called school directors in BiH. 
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be noted that the government authorities2 can still influence the school boards’ work through their 
official representation as founders of the schools. These representatives may be personnel working 
in schools or in government offices. Since school board decisions are made based on majority vote, 
the number of founders’ (government) representatives is a very important indicator of a school 
board’s autonomy and has implications for a board’s work (OSCE, 2006).  
Second, the Framework Law requires that public school directors be appointed by the school 
boards. Under the SBM system, school boards determine school policies and effectuate their 
decisions through the appointment of school directors.3 Among the school board tasks, the 
appointment of school directors is indeed regarded as one of the most important duties, along with 
approving school budgets and addressing personnel issues (OSCE, 2006). This provision is a 
significant departure from the previous system where directors were appointed by the respective 
ministers of education; under such an appointment system, school directors were compelled to 
conform to the agenda set by the cantonal and entity governments (U.S. Department of State, 2005).  
Reform as Political Utility 
On the surface, the adoption of the SBM reform in BiH appears to follow the pattern of 
institutional isomorphism, an influential perspective in the field of comparative and international 
education. According to the theories associated with institutional isomorphism, such as neo-
institutionalism and world culture theory, nation-states do not develop education systems unique to 
their national contexts; they adopt global models of education systems, or reforms to improve them, 
legitimized by the network of international organizations (Meyer & Ramirez, 2000). This isomorphic 
pressure is considered to have an inescapable force, supposedly facilitating homogenization deep 
within institutions. Policy-makers do not have a choice but to accept and enact the global models 
which have “historically gained scienticized legitimacy, much professional elaboration, and extensive 
resources” (Ramirez & Meyer, 2002, pp. 10-11). With the global models more easily available and 
actively advocated by international organizations, it is argued that these global models penetrate daily 
life more than ever before (Meyer, et al., 1997). 
It is important to note here that the sociological analysis of institutional isomorphism 
focuses on systems rather than the individuals who control them. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue 
that organizations are increasingly similar because these organizations want to enhance political 
power and institutional legitimacy. In this context, the principle unit of analysis is organization. 
Institutionalists emphasize the symbolic or cultural processes of reform adoption, and distinguish 
themselves from micro-realists who view policy-making as a consequence of rationalistic calculation 
of interests by the individual actors involved (Meyer et al., 1997). In institutionalists’ studies, 
therefore, national policy leaders’ decisions to adopt externally imported reforms are often not 
contextualized and closely scrutinized. 
                                                 
2 The term “government authorities” here refers to both regional and municipal governments, each of which 
can be a school founder. Generally, both governments are controlled by the same ethno-national political 
party. In ethnically mixed regions, however, a regional education authority is headed by an ethno-national 
political party, while some municipalities in the region may be led by a party belonging to another ethno-
national group. 
3 Article 15 of the Framework Law stipulates that “the director for each public school is appointed by the 
school board, in the proceedings that are envisaged by the Entity’s, Cantonal and Brčko District of BiH laws 
and School’s Rules” (Government of BiH, 2003, p. 15). 
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In fact, institutionalists in comparative education assume that policy leaders adopt global 
reform models for the same reason that they predominantly desire to enhance the international 
recognition of their nation-state legitimacy. Mass schooling funded by the state is a typical example 
provided by institutionalist scholars to illustrate this point; such a state project is assigned “meaning 
and legitimacy” as a program to promote nation-building, while making other programs 
“unintelligible and unsupportable” in the eyes of the international community (Ramirez & Boli, 
1987, p. 3). It should be pointed out that institutionalists recognize that globally popular projects, 
such as mass schooling, do not necessarily withstand empirical evidence to support their efficiency 
and effectiveness. Still, the important point remains that national leaders believe in “secularized and 
unconditionally universalistic versions of the salvation story,” and pursue it persistently in order to 
increase the nations’ legitimacy (Meyer et al., 1997, p. 174). From the institutionalists’ perspective, 
then, policy leaders loyally transmit global values and facilitate their embodiment in national 
education systems.   
In the past, critiques of institutional isomorphism theories have pointed out variations in 
policy implementation. Steiner-Khamsi (2006), for example, insisted that the global convergence of 
education occurred only at the level of “policy talk” and very rarely at the level of implementation. 
Indeed, various case studies indicate that global models of education reforms deviate from their 
original intents during implementation due to local practitioners’ norms, practices and resistance 
(Anderson-Levitt, 2003; Phillips & Ochs, 2003; Rui, 2007). What seems to be lacking, or not 
sufficiently employed, in these critiques is a political analysis focusing on the practices and behaviors 
of the national authorities who introduce the reforms in the first place. This paper illustrates that 
attending to the legitimacy contexts in which these national authorities find themselves and noting 
their commitment, or lack thereof, to follow through on legislated reforms can provide meaningful 
insights into the process of global reform adoption. In conducting such an analysis, Weiler’s political 
utility theory provides a useful guide. 
While the institutionalists’ claim of isomorphism would lead us to believe that policy leaders 
uniformly adopt globally popular reform agendas and implement them in their own countries, the 
political utility argument of reform adoption calls for the need to consider the reasons that elites 
decide to adopt a global reform and to critically view their commitment to implement it. Hans N. 
Weiler (1983) contends that modern capitalist states are in constant need of legitimation as the range 
and scope of the state’s activities expand. Governments face legitimacy deficits since their resources 
are insufficient to satisfy the local constituents’ needs or to “purchase legitimacy through various 
kinds of material gratification” (p. 261). Weiler then asserts that education is one of the most 
contested areas and requires high levels of legitimation because of its role in socializing future 
citizens into accepting and sustaining existing social structures. It is not surprising, then, that policy 
leaders may view education reforms as an important mechanism for legitimacy compensation 
(Weiler, 1983).  
Weiler’s argument concerning policy leaders’ legitimacy, which is central to his political 
utility theory, contrasts with that of institutionalists. While institutional isomorphism theorists 
assume that policy leaders adopt global reforms in order to enhance the legitimacy of statehood 
(“external” legitimacy), that is, recognition from the global community of nation-states, political 
utility theory predicts that national authorities do so in order to augment their own legitimacy among 
domestic constituents (“internal” legitimacy). The institutionalist focus on external legitimacy is 
understandable in light of the fact that institutional theory originates from organizational studies. In 
a business or professional organization, the leadership’s primary concern for legitimacy is often 
directed toward external stakeholders who determine the continuity or discontinuity of the leader’s 
service. The leadership in many nation-states, however, survives on internal legitimacy. It is this 
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reason that Weiler’s political utility theory is useful, indeed necessary, when analyzing the motivation 
of politicians to adopt global reform models. It should be noted, however, that policy leaders may 
want to increase both internal and external legitimacy since they are often complementary. In the 
case of BiH, increased trust from the international community could help gain public trust since 
their leaders are then seen to have the confidence of key international supporters who can usher BiH 
into a regional block of prosperity. 
The political utility argument also differs from a perspective developed by Gita Steiner-
Khamsi, a leading critique of institutionalism in comparative education. Having noted the gap 
between policy rhetoric and implementation in policy importing nations, Steiner-Khamsi offers her 
insights into the reason that policy leaders adopt global reforms. In her analysis, a group of policy 
leaders often evoke “international standards” in order to advance their own ideas against others,’ as 
these standards are supposedly neutral, and therefore have a salutary effect on protracted policy 
conflict (Steiner-Khamsi, 2010). Once international funding is secured, however, policy leaders 
“reinterpret” global norms and implement reforms in the ways they believe enhance national 
development. In Mongolia, for example, political leadership continued its rhetorical support of 
decentralization in order to receive international funding, while they in fact re-centralized some of 
the education administration functions due to their belief that a centralized system is more effective 
in delivering educational services (Steiner-Khamsi & Stolpe, 2004). Curiously, the analysis of reason 
behind the adoption of global reforms, namely the promotion of nation building, resonates with the 
previously described institutionalist argument regarding education reform transfer. The analysis 
offered by Steiner-Khamsi (and Stolpe) did not sufficiently take into account, or address, the aspect 
of reforms as compensatory legitimation. 
Among various global reforms, decentralization of education governance is particularly 
illustrative of compensatory legitimation. According to Weiler (1990), education decentralization, 
which promises to redistribute authority, improve system efficiency, and facilitate cultures of 
learning, is a “precarious and problematic proposition” (p. 439) since there are also powerful 
arguments favoring centralization to advance the learning environment. Against the background of 
legitimacy deficit that modern states are presumed to face, Weiler developed a hypothesis that policy 
makers adopted decentralization reforms, not because of their belief in the supposed benefits of 
decentralization, but because of their desire to increase political legitimacy among the nations’ 
populace. Weiler alludes to the fundamental contradiction between decentralization and the central 
authority’s desire to consolidate power. He argues that genuine sharing of power seriously affects 
the central authority’s ability to use the education system to maintain existing social relations and 
systems. In this context, Weiler continues, national policy leaders may attempt to achieve two 
conflicting objectives with regard to decentralization reforms: “retaining as much (centralized) 
control over the system as is possible without a severe loss in legitimacy, while at least appearing to 
be committed to decentralization and thus reaping the benefits in legitimation to be derived from 
that appearance” (Weiler, 1990, p. 442).  
Weiler’s analysis of a reform as legitimacy compensation is pertinent to the SBM reform in 
post-conflict BiH. At the time of the SBM reform introduction, BiH suffered from a severe lack of 
resources and administrative capacities to deliver public services since the nation was emerging from 
the civil war. In addition, political leaders’ ethno-nationalistic agendas were not necessarily 
appreciated by the citizens. Already, the public trust in regional governments appeared to have been 
weakening; the polling patterns during the general elections between 1996, a year after the conflict 
ended, and 2002, a year prior to the promulgation of the Framework Law that introduced the SBM 
reform, showed that citizens’ support of the three dominant ethno-national parties was declining 
(Søberg, 2006). The twelve regional governments, each of them acting as a central authority in their 
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respective localities, may have perceived the SBM reform as an opportunity to enhance their 
legitimacy among local constituents who increasingly viewed their governments as incapable and 
corrupt. The acceptance of the EU-endorsed SBM reform, at least rhetorically, was particularly 
important for the BiH political leaders since it would respond to the public aspiration for European 
integration. Such behavior by the authorities is congruent with the fact that all three dominant 
political parties have consistently expressed their commitment to the nation’s integration into the 
EU (Toal & Maksić, 2011).  
At the same time, however, these political leaders would not desire to compromise their 
authority over the schools through which they eagerly promoted their ethno-nationalist agendas. 
Their political platforms are built on ethno-centric ideologies. They may have considered the 
adoption of the SBM reform a means to gain public support, while in reality, implementing it 
superficially without losing their control over the schools. In order to substantiate this thesis, the 
authorities’ practices and behaviors regarding the reform implementation should be examined, since 
they can indicate the policy leaders’ views on the decentralization reform as either political utility or 
genuine redistribution of power. The meaning of such an inquiry was evoked by Thomas Popkewitz 
in his analysis of educational reforms. Popkewitz (1991) questioned the assumption of institutional 
isomorphism regarding the linear and natural process of reform and change, and called on the 
importance of social epistemology to underscore the social relations of actors when analyzing 
educational reforms in each national context. He urges an analysis grounded in political, social, and 
cultural contexts to locate indigenous forms of control that affect actual practices (Popkewitz, 1991; 
1996). Since decentralization entails a change in power relations, it is then critical to contextually 
examine who actually holds power to affect school governance. As this paper shows in the next 
section, empirical data seem to indicate that BiH authorities want to retain their power over schools, 
despite their official approval of the SBM reform. 
Evidence of Derailed Reform Implementation 
This study advances the thesis that policy leaders in BiH accepted an SBM reform in order 
to enhance their internal legitimacy, rather than to advance decentralized school governance and the 
nation’s legitimacy as a democratic member of the international community, as institutionalists 
would claim. As such, the supposed objectives of the reform, such as school autonomy and local 
community ownership, may not be the leaders’ primary concerns. This section presents evidence 
suggesting that the ruling political parties, while they accepted the Framework Law at the National 
Assembly, in fact resisted the SBM reform during a less publicized implementation stage in the 
respective regions under their control. The forms of resistance or reluctance tend to be subtle, but 
sufficiently indicate the governments’ unwillingness to relinquish their exclusive control over school 
management.  
The evidence presented here reveals that the ruling political elites in regional governments, 
though in different degrees, generally did not respect the principles of school autonomy and local 
ownership of schools. First, this section will show the regional governments’ possible attempts to 
delay the implementation process. This evidence was drawn from donor reports and OHR press 
releases. Second, the member composition of school boards in all twelve regions will be presented 
to illustrate that the governments have been over-represented on the boards, in most cases at the 
expense of local stakeholder representation. Lastly, the section demonstrates that the school director 
appointment process currently used does not clearly reflect the concept of school autonomy. The 
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empirical data supporting the latter two points was drawn from a field study conducted in 2011.4 In 
addition, regional by-laws were reviewed and cross-referenced with the Framework Law and field 
data.5 These sets of evidence were then assessed in combination with the legitimacy contexts of the 
policy leaders to argue that the political utility theory can effectively help explain the SBM reform 
adoption process in BiH.   
First, records show that the three regional governments in FBiH, ruled by the same party, 
delayed the SBM implementation process. All twelve regional governments were expected to amend 
their regional by-laws on education in accordance with the content of the Framework Law soon after 
its enactment. However, the three governments failed to do this, resulting in the OHR’s imposition 
of the necessary amendments in their regional by-laws. As an illustration of this affair, an excerpt 
from an OHR press release is presented below, where the OHR reprimanded the ruling party in the 
three cantonal governments (OHR, 2004). 
With this Decision, the High Representative has addressed a situation which represented a 
challenge both to the Rule of Law and to the international obligations of BiH. Last year, the 
HDZ, together with all other parties, voted for the State Framework Law on Primary and 
Secondary Education. This was a unanimous vote in the State Parliament. Yet since the end 
of last year, these cantons with HDZ education ministers have consistently failed to take 
action to harmonise their cantonal laws with the State legislation. 
The regional governments run by HDZ eventually enacted their by-laws, but these laws were 
not faithfully applied to the formation of school boards. For example, in one of the three regions, its 
by-law stipulated that “members of the school board shall be elected from among the teachers and 
professional associates, founder, local community and parents” (OSCE, 2006, p. 69). This provision 
appears to honor the corresponding section in the Framework Law that ensures inclusive school 
governance with the participation of laypersons from the school communities. This clause is 
followed by another one expressing the principle of equal representation between key stakeholders: 
“one third of the school board members shall be elected from among teachers and professional 
associates, one third from among the founder …, one third from among parents” (OSCE, 2006, p. 
69); however, it is important to note that this second clause did not include local community 
representatives, a central tenet of local community ownership of schools as guaranteed by the SBM 
reform. Moreover, the field data showed that almost all school boards in this region actually 
included two ministry representatives and only one parent. This evidence suggests that the regional 
government deliberately deviated from the reform goals of decentralized governance.  
                                                 
4 The study employed an anonymous, self-administered paper survey which was distributed to all 291 
secondary school directors in BiH based on the lists provided by the twelve regional governments. The 
survey contained closed-ended questions and a section for additional comments concerning the composition 
of school boards and the school director appointment process. The response rate was 51.5%. All regions in 
BiH were represented by survey results. The study did not discern significant regional patterns in terms of the 
response rates. Concurrently, 16 interviews were conducted with school directors selected by the combination 
of purposive and random sampling. All the regions, except Canton 10, were represented by at least one 
interviewee. The interviews were conducted to understand the nature of the relationship between school 
directors and school boards, and the general dynamics of school governance after the introduction of the 
SBM reform. The interviewees were guaranteed confidentiality of their personal information. For more 
information concerning the methodology utilized by this study, see Komatsu (2012). Quotes presented in the 
present paper were modified for clarity. 
5 The study reviewed translated versions of regional by-laws enclosed in the OSCE report on school boards 
(OSCE, 2006). 
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The over-representation of government-appointed personnel on school boards is seen in 
other regions of BiH as well. In many of these regions, the governments are more represented than 
local stakeholders, namely parents and local community representatives. Table 1 shows the summary 
of findings regarding the school board composition in all twelve regions.6 In presenting the data, a 
comparison was made between government representation, including those appointed by the 
ministry and municipality (they are normally managed by the same political party), and local 
representation, including both parents and local community members. Teachers were not 
incorporated into the analysis since they may represent both the interests of governments and local 
stakeholders, rendering it difficult to assign them to either group. The table shows that government 
representation outweighed the local stakeholders in seven regions (R6-R12). Only two regions (R1 
and R2) truly respected local ownership by ensuring more representation of local stakeholders. 
Another three regions (R3-R5) demonstrated more or less equal representation of parents and 
governments, though none of them included local community representatives. In fact, the school 
boards in only one region (R1) consistently included at least one local community representative. 
The field data largely show the BiH governments’ reluctance to cede their power over schools, 
despite their agreement with the Framework Law mandating school-based governance and 
management.  
 
Table 1 
School board member composition 
Representation Region 
 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 
Ministry 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 
Municipality 0 0 2 3 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Parents 1 2 2 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Local Community 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Teacher 2 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 
 
Government 
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Source: Compiled by the author based on data collected in 2011. 
Finally, the governments’ reluctance to fully implement the SBM reform is also observed in 
the school director appointment process. As noted earlier, the Framework Law entrusts school boards 
with the authority to appoint school directors. However, the field data indicates otherwise. The 
survey data showed that, in most cases, school directors were chosen in two stages, with the 
involvement of regional authorities in the second stage. Typically, school boards forwarded their 
recommended candidates to regional authorities for approval; rarely did school boards choose their 
school directors without the consent of regional authorities.  
Remarks made by survey respondents are indicative of the nature and extent of such 
government interference. One survey respondent pointed out the ambiguity of the dual 
                                                 
6 Some variations regarding school board composition exist among schools within a region. The table reflects 
the majority case in each region. 
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confirmation system, wondering whose word is final in determining the selection of a candidate. 
Most respondents indicated that it was the education ministers who had the final say on 
appointments. Many also complained that the school director appointment process was influenced 
by the party politics of the ministers, as the following remark indicates: “In practice, the minister 
chooses directors. He abuses his position. He wants ‘party’ schools.” Another respondent admitted 
the government’s influence in school board work by disclosing that “active participation of school 
boards in governing schools is greatly limited by the ministry. The ministry often makes obstructions 
against the authority of the school boards.”  
Interview data generally concurred with the survey data presented. Some interviewees 
expressed concerns about the confidentiality of their responses in the beginning of their interviews, 
exhibiting great sensitivity towards the government authorities; this indicates that school directors’ 
status and work is seriously affected by the decisions of education ministers. During interviews, 
many participants alluded to the persistent influence of government authorities on school 
governance. For example, one interviewee, noting that the ratio of government representatives on 
school boards recently increased in the region, bluntly admitted that “perhaps they wanted to 
increase their influence in schools.” Another interviewee alluded to the influence of party politics on 
school governance, while stressing that such influence came from the government, rather than from 
among civilian members of the board. Lastly, the following remark made by one interviewee clearly 
captures the politicized situation of school governance: “Those political parties…schools belong to 
particular parties. … They say this school is red, this one is green, this one is…or the director would 
be this one, or that one.” The government authorities’ persistent influence on school governance is 
clearly noted in these interview remarks.  
In this section, the analysis of official documents and field data was presented to show that 
regional governments derailed the SBM reform implementation by faltering on implementation or 
altering the alignment of their by-laws, thus maintaining significant influence on school boards and 
on the appointment of school heads. Both survey and interview data demonstrate that a core 
function of school boards, or more broadly decentralized school governance, was compromised in 
the reform implementation stage, and suggest the education authorities’ unwillingness to fully 
implement the SBM reform. These pieces of evidence point to the possibility that the government 
gesture to accept the global SBM reform by signing the Framework Law may have been a public 
display, rather than the reflection of their commitment to redistribute power and promote 
democratic school governance.  
Summary and Discussion 
This paper presented an argument that the SBM reform in BiH may possibly be the 
outcome of a political utility consideration. The ruling political parties accepted the SBM reform in 
policy rhetoric, but resisted its implementation. Against a backdrop of dwindling public approval of 
government performance, BiH political leaders may have utilized the EU-endorsed SBM reform as 
an opportunity to appeal to the populace’s aspiration for European integration, thereby 
compensating for their legitimacy deficit. If this is the case, the political leaders’ agreement with the 
SBM reform should not be interpreted as their belief in the “universalistic scientiﬁc and professional 
deﬁnitions” (Meyer et al., 1997, p. 174) of education systems advocated by international 
organizations, as presumed by institutionalists. By presenting this argument, the study advocates the 
need to closely attend to political leaders’ legitimacy contexts, along with their practices and 
behaviors, as they adopt and implement global reforms.  
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A major limitation of the political utility theory lies in its inherent difficulty to prove 
empirically that national authorities adopt reforms for legitimacy compensation. A less than full 
implementation of decentralization reforms may indicate the lack of authorities’ commitment and 
suggest the use of the reforms as political utility. However, policy implementation gaps may also be 
the result of technical errors, capacity deficiencies, or “cultural misunderstanding” (Steiner-Khamsi 
& Stolpe, 2004, p. 46) of global norms. Institutionalists, on their part, would argue that policy 
implementation gaps are the results of “decoupling.” Decoupling denotes that organizations adopt 
mainstream ideas to gain legitimacy with their external constituents while their actual practices may 
vary in response to practical considerations; in this case, organizations encourage autonomous 
professionalism so as to allow grass-roots implementers to adjust policies to local contexts (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). However, the evidence presented in this paper suggests otherwise. BiH education 
authorities have maintained, rather than loosened, their control on school governance by ensuring 
their solid representation on school boards and by influencing the school director appointment 
process. In this aspect, this study shares Steiner-Khamsi’s view that loose coupling should be 
interpreted as resistance by government authorities (Steiner-Khamsi, 2010). Considering that 
education has been heavily politicized in post-conflict BiH, a cautious look at the reform process 
from a political perspective, rather than an administrative or cultural view, is warranted.  
A crucial point in this paper lies in its assertion that national policy leaders can still be central 
players in reform adoption, even in the globalized world that exerts isomorphic pressures on 
national education systems. While isomorphism theories may describe institutions and their 
decision-makers as somewhat passive recipients of environmental pressures, the political utility 
theory assumes that national authorities are active players in utilizing reforms to advance their 
political gains. While political leaders may not always make decisions based on the calculation of 
self-serving interests, this paper argues that assessing their motives, practices and behaviors is crucial 
to understanding the process of global reform adoption, particularly in societies where political 
leaders do not enjoy broad-based support from the public. 
Implications 
This study has implications for research concerning education reform transfer. The study 
suggests the importance of political analysis that scrutinizes policy leaders’ intent to accept global 
reforms and critically examines their practices and behaviors during reform implementation, 
especially when the reform entails the redistribution of power and the political leadership is unstable 
or in serious crisis. In this context, Weiler’s political utility theory, which sheds light on national 
leadership’s commitment to decentralization reforms, can make an important contribution to the 
debate around educational reform transfer. Comparative and international education scholars are 
urged to incorporate the aspect of legitimacy compensation into their analysis of why and how 
global reforms are adopted in policy-importing nations; this is particularly important considering 
that many global reforms, such as community participation, a child-centered approach, and 
organizational autonomy, are essentially democratic notions which entail the redistribution of power 
and challenge the authority of political leadership. Taking into consideration the full range of 
political leaders’ reasons to adopt externally induced reforms should enhance our ability to analyze 
and explain the process of global reform adoption. 
The study has practical implications for international assistance as well. Attending to 
national authorities’ reasons for adopting reforms is important because policies implemented with 
“an ulterior reason” often fail to achieve their objectives, with grave consequences. Fullan (2001) 
argues that grass-roots implementers of education reforms, such as school principals and teachers, 
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accurately assess whether new policies or reforms are implemented with the serious intent of the 
authorities or not; if it is the latter case, these implementers will never take the reforms seriously. 
Moreover, a policy failure may increase the implementers’ cynicism toward any future reforms 
(Fowler, 2009). In some cases, international assistance may lose its credibility from these crucial 
field-level implementers, and even the general public, if it keeps supporting reforms that politicians 
have no intention of implementing. Positioning national authorities at the center of reform adoption 
is indeed a critical step when assessing the feasibility of any global reform implementation. 
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